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CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO AMEND
THE CLEAN WATER ACT: AMERICAN WETLANDS
UNDER ATTACK
I. INTRODUCTION
Forty percent of the nation's wetlands have already been irretriev-
ably lost, with the remainder disappearing at an annual rate of 300,000
to 400,000 acres.1  The future of wetlands and their protection will
become more uncertain if House of Representatives, Federal Bill 961
(unenacted) [hereinafter H.R. 961],2 recently passed by Congress to
amend the Clean Water Act,3 becomes law. These amendments drastically
change the regulation of remaining wetlands by altering the existing
provisions which govern the issuance of permits to fill wetlands. 4 The
initial creation and adoption of the Clean Water Act left the area of
wetland regulation vague and ambiguous. 5 Due to this vagueness, it has
since been the responsibility of various regulating authorities to define
and interpret regulation requirements for the dredging and filling of
wetlands. 6 To this end, part II of this article addresses the current
permitting regulations for the dredging and filling of wetlands. Part III
outlines the rationale utilized by the courts to uphold the Army Corps of
Engineers [hereinafter the Corps] and the Environmental Protection
Agency's [hereinafter EPA] jurisdiction over the permit process for the
dredging and filling of wetlands. Part IV analyzes H.R. 961 961 and the
changes that will occur in the permitting process if President Clinton
signs H.R. 961 into law. 7 Finally, Part V addresses alternatives to H.R.
961.
1. Wa.LIAm H, RoDxERs JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.6 n.23 (2d ed. 1994).
2. H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (creating the Comprehensive Wetlands Conservation
and Management Act of 1995). Although there are numerous other aspects of 1995 H.R. 961, this
Note will center around the modifications to wetlands protection.
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
4. H.R. 961 § 801. See infra part IV (discussing the creation of the Comprehensive Wetlands
Conservation and Management Act of 1995 and the modifications suggested by Congress for
classification and permitting of wetlands).
5. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988) (failing to include wetland regulation within its provisions).
6. See infra part II (discussing the current regulation process for the dredging and filling of
wetland areas).
7. A presidential veto of H.R. 961 is quite likely. See Craig Quintana, Effort to Revamp 1972
Clean Water Act Draws Fire. Some Insist the Law Imposes Unnecessary Restrictions. Its Backers Say
Pollution Would Increase if the Law is Changed, OaD.No SNTINEL,. May 21, 1995. at B I (discussing
President Clinton's reaction to H.R. 961 and his promises to veto the legislation). Given the enthusiasm
with which Congress attempts to change the manner of regulating activities in wetland areas, even if a
presidential veto does occur, there is sure to be alternatives to H.R. 961 in the near future. Id.
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II. CURRENT PROCESSES FOR OBTAINING A PERMIT FOR THE
DREDGING AND FILLING OF WETLAND AREAS
The primary goal of the Clean Water Act is "to maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 8 To
preserve the integrity of the nation's waters, Congress has prohibited any
discharge of dredged 9 or fill materials10 into "navigable waters" unless
the discharge is authorized by a permit."I
A. INTERPRETING THE CLEAN WATER ACT TO REQUIRE A PERMIT FOR
THE DREDGING AND FILLING OF WETLANDS
Navigable waters are defined as the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas. 12 Based on this definition, it appears that
the drafters of the Clean Water Act did not specifically include wetland
protection in the permitting process.13 However, the goal of the Clean
Water Act is to protect the waters of the United States. 14 The Code of
Federal Regulations defines "waters of the United States" to include all
interstate waters including interstate wetlands and wetlands adjacent to
waters of the United States. 15 As such, it appears that wetlands fall within
the protection of the Clean Water Act's permit process to further the
primary goal of the Clean Water Act.
Wetlands are defined as areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to, and
under normal circumstances, do sustain a prevalence of vegetation
adapted to live in consistently saturated soil conditions.16 The proximity
of the wetland area to other waters is a factor in the determination of the
Corps' jurisdiction. Adjacent wetlands are those which border or are
otherwise contiguous to other waters of the United States separated from
those waters by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach
dunes, and the like.17 Isolated wetlands are areas not part of a surface
tributary system or other navigable water and are not adjacent to such
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
9. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1) (1995) (defining the phrase "discharge of dredged material" as the
addition, including any redeposit of dredged material, into the waters of the United States). Dredged
material means material that is excavated or dredged from waters of the United States. Id. § 323.2(c).
10. Id. § 323.2(e). The term "fill material" means any material used for the primary purpose of
replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody. Id.
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
12. Id. § 1362(7).
13. See id. § 1344 (requiring disposal permits for navigable waters).
14. Id. § 1251.
15. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(2), (7) (1995).
16. Id. § 328.3(b).
17. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(b) (1995).
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tributary waterbodies.18 The Corps has the authority to regulate activities
in the waters of the United States, however, the proximity of the wetland
to other waters is a factor for determining whether the Corps has jurisdic-
tion. 19
A broad interpretation of the Corps' jurisdiction over waters and
adjacent wetlands aids in the restoration and maintenance of the nation's
waters. By broadly defining "waters of the United States," numerous
unintended waters may fall within the jurisdiction of the Corps. How-
ever, the alternative is a rigid definition where development will result in
filling thousands, if not millions, of wetland acres. Clearly, the loss of
extensive wetland areas would defeat the Clean Water Act's goal of
maintaining the integrity of the Nation's waters. 20  In fact, some courts
have taken this interpretation one step further to conclude that Congress
intended to extend the Corps' jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act to
the maximum extent possible. 21 In order for activities to be allowed in
most wetland areas, a permit for the specified activity is required.
B. THE PERMIT PROCESS
In order to initiate certain activities in wetland areas, a permit for the
activity is required.22 There are standard procedures and time frames for
the granting or denying a permit. 23 Even though the permitting process
appears difficult and time consuming, the alternative involves the con-
18. 33 C.F.R. § 330.2(e) (1995). See infra part III (discussing the classification system used by
the Corps in the determination of jurisdictional matters).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988). This section provides that certain activities in the waters of the
United States are prohibited, unless recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the
Secretary of the Army. Id. Included in these prohibited activities is the excavation or fill of the
waters of the United States. Id.
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of
the Clean Water Act).
21. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 64 (1980)
(finding the Federal Water Pollution Control Act should be given the broadest possible reading
consistent with the Commerce Clause); Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977) (finding Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean
Water Act), were intended to extend the Act's jurisdiction to the constitutional limit); United States v.
Sargent County Water Resource Dist., 876 F. Supp. 1081 (D.N.D. 1992) (holding that Congress
intended to extend jurisdiction of CWA to the constitutional limit); United States v. Zanger, 767 F.
Supp. 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding that Congress intended that the term "waters of the United
States" within the CWA be interpreted as broadly as constitutionally possible under the Commerce
Clause); Parkview Corp. v. Department of Army Corps of Eng'rs, 469 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(following the holding in Hoffman that by enacting the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, Congress intended to extend the Act's jurisdiction to the constitutional limit). See
infra part III (discussing the courts interpretation of the Corps' jurisdiction).
22. See generally Ted Griswold, Comment, Wetland Protection Under Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act: An Enforcement Paradox, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 139 (1990) (discussing agency conflicts
in the enforcement of Clean Water Act provisions).
23. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2 (1995) (describing the processing of applications).
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tinued loss of valuable wetland areas. The permitting process is initiated
when an application is filed with the Corps .24
C. THE APPi.ICATION
Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,25 a
permit requires that either an environmental assessment or an environ-
mental impact statement [hereinafter EIS] be completed. 26 The district
engineer reviews the application for completeness and within fifteen
days, issues public notice of the proposed activity unless the activity is
specifically exempted or the application is incomplete. 27 By giving
public notice, the district engineer encourages society to comment on the
project. 28 The comment period runs for a reasonable time not exceed-
ing thirty days but cannot be less than fifteen days from the date of
notice. 29 The district engineer accepts and reviews any comments made
pursuant to this notice. 30 These comments are made available to the
applicant, who may then contact anyone objecting to the project. 31
Ultimately, the comments become part of the administrative record. 32
When the comment period ends, the district engineer prepares either
a statement of findings, or where an EIS has been completed, a record of
decision which includes the district engineer's views of the project's
effect on the public interest including conformity with the guidelines
published for the discharge of dredged or fill material into waters of the
United States. 33 Specifically, if the permit is contrary to state or local
decisions, the district engineer includes the significant national issues and
explains how these issues are of overriding importance. 34 If the district
engineer determines that a significant interest in the outcome of the
permit process exists, the district engineer makes the decision available to
the media or other interested parties, by informing the parties that it is
only a recommendation and not a final decision. 35 "District engineers
24. Id. § 325.2.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).
26. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(4) (1995). See infra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the
relevance of the environmental impact statement).
27. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(1),(2). The authority for administering the Corps' regulatory program is
delegated to 36 division engineers and 11 district engineers. Id. § 320.1(a)(2). These district
engineers are authorized by the Corps to issue formal determinations concerning the applicability of
the Clean Water Act in the permitting of proposed activities. Id. § 320.1(a)(6).
28. Id. §§ 325.2(a)(2), (3).
29. Id. § 325.1(d)(2).
30. Id. § 325.2(a)(3).
31. Id.
32. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(3).
33. Id. § 325.2(a)(6). These records also include the conformity of the project to § 404(b)(1)
guidelines. Id. See infra part II.C.2 (discussing the § 404(b)(1) guidelines).
34. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(6).
35. Id. If the district engineer determines there is a potential impact to a threatened or
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will decide on all applications not later than sixty days after receipt of a
complete application." 36 The district engineer then forwards the entire
administrative record to the agency official authorized to make the final
decision .37
If the agency official denies the permit, the applicant receives
written notice of the denial as well as the reasons for denial. 38 However,
if the agency grants the permit, the applicant receives a standard form
permit which lists any limitations placed on the activity.39
1. The Environmental Impact Statement
The EIS includes the environmental impact of the proposed
action.40 Included in the EIS are any adverse environmental effects
which cannot be avoided, alternatives to the proposed action, the
relationship between local short-term uses of the environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any
irreversible and irretrievable commitments or resources involved in the
proposed action.4 1 After the completion of an EIS or a determination
that an EIS statement is not required, the district engineer looks to the
guidelines set forth in the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) to make
the decision to issue or deny a permit.42
2. Consideration of Guidelines
Section 404(b)(1) guidelines were developed for the purpose of
evaluating disposal sites including dredge and fill activities pursuant to
the Clean Water Act. 43 Generally, these guidelines state that a permit
endangered species pursuant to section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, the district engineer will
initiate formal consultation procedures with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or National Marine
Fisheries Service. Id. § 325.2(b)(5).
36. Id. § 325.2(d)(3). This 60 day period may be adjusted upon various findings including: the
procedure is precluded as a matter of law, the case must be referred to a higher authority, the
comment period is extended, a timely submittal of information or comments is not received from the
applicant, the processing is suspended at the request of the applicant, or information needed by the
district engineer for a decision on the application cannot reasonably be obtained within the 60 day
period. Id.
37. Id. § 325.2(a)(6).
38. Id. § 325.2(a)(7).
39. 33 C.F.R § 325.2(a)(7). "The permit is not valid until signed by the issuing official." Id. A
list of all permits which are granted or denied is published monthly. Id. § 325.2(a)(8). Included in this
publication is information regarding the availability of statements of findings and records of decisions.
Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988). The basic functions of environmental impact statements (EIS's)
are to aid in the decision making process and to provide the public with information in order to
encourage public participation. See Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974)
(stating the basic purposes of the EIS).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (C).
42. See infra part ll.C.2 (discussing the § 404(b)(1) guidelines).
43. 33 U.S.C § 1344(b) (1988) (giving the authority to the Administrator to issue guidelines). The
guidelines indicate that:
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should not be granted unless the applicant demonstrates that any dredge
or fill operations will not have an unacceptable adverse impact on the
ecosystem. 44 Whenever dredged or fill material is introduced into a
wetland area, it is likely to adversely impact the area. These guidelines
attempt to specify when such adverse impacts become unacceptable.
The guidelines state that a permit will not be granted if a practical
alternative to the proposed action exists and the alternative has a less
adverse impact on the ecosystem.45 This practicable alternatives test has
been described as essentially a land use planning overlay. 46 The
practicable alternatives test ranks alternative sites or project
configurations for developments that require discharge into wetlands. 47
When filling can be avoided, alternatives with the least adverse
environmental impacts should be selected for development. 48 The
purpose of the project is to determine the available alternatives. 49 In the
past, deference was given to the applicant's classification of the
purpose.50 Therefore, the purpose of the project is significant to the
granting of a permit because it identifies whether practicable alternatives
exist.51 The Corps now exercises its judgment regarding the basic
purpose and need for the project, considering both the applicants and
the public's interests.52
(a) The purpose of these Guidelines is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of waters of the United States through the control of discharges
of dredged or fill material.
(b) Congress has expressed a number of policies in the Clean Water Act. These
Guidelines are intended to be consistent with and to implement those policies.
(c) Fundamental to these Guidelines is the precept that dredged or fill material should not
be discharged into the aquatic ecosystem, unless it can be demonstrated that such a
discharge will not have an unacceptable adverse impact either individually or in
combination with known and/or probable impacts of other activities affecting the
ecosystems of concern.
(d) From a national perspective, the degradation or destruction of special aquatic sites,
such as filling operations in wetlands, is considered to be among the most severe
environmental impacts covered by these Guidelines. The guiding principle should be that
degradation or destruction of special sites may represent an irreversible loss of valuable
aquatic resources.
40 C.F.R. § 230.1 (1994).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 230.10(a).
46. Luke Danielson & Mary Lou Nordell. Wetlands Litigation: Current Issues and New
Directions, C855 A.L.I. A.B.A. 341,350 (1993).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 351.
50. Id.
51. Danielson & Nordell, supra note 46, at 351.
52. Id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 325, app. B(9)(c)(4) (1992)).
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In the development of wetland protection, the Corps balanced
alternatives and considered economic and environmental factors
involved in applying to fill wetland areas.53 The granting of a permit
depends on the availability of practical alternatives having a less adverse
impact on the ecosystem. 54 An application of the practicable alternatives
consideration was addressed in O'Connor v. Corps of Engineers, United
States Army. 55 In O'Connor, the court addressed the practicable
alternatives critical in the denial of a permit for the building of a
swimming pool, jogging track, and tennis court on an Indiana wetland.5
6
The court found that the Corps made a reasonable determination
that the. danger to the surrounding aquatic resources by the dredge and
fill project outweighed the benefits of the project.57 The court upheld
the Corps' finding that O'Connor failed to address existing, practicable
alternatives, and that the foreseeable adverse impacts that the project
53. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1994). The practical alternative analysis is further expounded:
(2) An alternative is practicable if it is available and capable of being done after taking
into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall project
purposes. If it is otherwise a practicable alternative, an area not presently owned by the
applicant which could reasonably be obtained, utilized, expanded or managed in order to
fulfill the basic purpose of the proposed activity may be considered.
(3) Where the activity associated with a discharge which is proposed for a special
aquatic site (as defined in Subpart E) does not require access or proximity to or siting
within the special aquatic site in question to fulfill its basic purpose (i.e., is not "water
dependent"), practicable alternatives that do not involve special aquatic sites are
presumed to be available, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise. In addition, where a
discharge is proposed for a special aquatic site, all practicable alternatives to the
proposed discharge which do not involve a discharge into a special aquatic site are
presumed to have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, unless clearly
demonstrated otherwise.
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2), (3) (1995). See also Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1454 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding the Corps conducts a general balancing of
economic and environmental factors and its ultimate determinations are entitled to substantial
deference).
54. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a).
55. 801 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
56. O'Connor v. Corp of Eng'rs, United States Army, 801 F. Supp. 185, 195 (N.D. Ind. 1992). In
May of 1989, O'Connor, a home owner, began filling a portion of the wetland on Sagauny Lake in
LaPorte County, Indiana, for developing a jogging track, tennis court and swimming pool. Id. at 187.
O'Connor advised the Corps of the activity and inquired whether a permit was required. Id. The
Corps stated a permit was not required as long as there were no deviations, because fill would not be
placed directly in the wetland. Id. After discovering fill was deposited into the wetland, the Corps
declared a Clean Water Act violation since the fill would impact the water quality of Sagauny Lake
and surrounding wetlands. Id. at 187. O'Connor requested an after-the-fact permit pursuant to the
Corps' Nationwide Permit program. Id. at 188. The Corps determined that O'Connor needed an
individual permit, based on the potentially adverse affect on the adjacent wetlands and 65 acre lake.
Id. After the Corps issued public notice and received comments, the Corps assumed that practicable
alternatives existed, and denied the individual permit, concluding it was contrary to the public interest.
Id. Despite significant modifications in his proposal, the Corps concluded that O'Connor failed to
address practical alternatives. Id. at 189. O'Connor argued that the Corps had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when it denied the permit to fill 41 acres of wetland. Id. at 194.
57. Id. at 195-96.
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would have outweighed the benefits accruing to O'Connor.58 The court
also determined that by failing to address practical alternatives, the Corps
may presume that practical alternatives exist.59
While the court and the Corps found that practical alternatives were
crucial to the determination of whether to grant a permit for the fill of
the wetland in O'Connor, Congress has ignored the practical alternative
analysis in some situations. Congress, through H.R. 961, strikes the
alternative analysis for some wetland areas by affording this protection
only to certain wetland areas.60
The guidelines also indicate that the issue of whether the proposed
action is water dependent or non-water dependent is a determining factor
in balancing the adverse impacts on the ecosystem. 61 The proposed
action is water dependent if it requires access or proximity to, or siting
within the aquatic site in question to fulfill its basic purpose. 62 The
404(b)(1) guidelines state that for non-water dependent operations
"practicable alternatives that do not involve special aquatic sites are
presumed to be available, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise." 63
The guidelines further indicate that a permit will not be granted
when its issuance violates any applicable state water quality standard,
violates any toxic effluent standard, jeopardizes the existence of a
endangered or threatened species under the Endangered Species Act of
1973, or violates any requirement to protect any marine sanctuary
designated under the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
of 1972.64 Additionally, the guidelines state that a permit will not be
granted which causes or contributes to significant degradation of the
waters of the United States. 65 Furthermore, the guidelines consider any
adverse impact on human health or welfare, adverse effects on life stages
of aquatic and other wildlife, adverse effects on the aquatic ecosystem, or
adverse effects on recreational, aesthetic, and economic values to be
unacceptable.66 A denial of a permit is appropriate unless appropriate
and practicable steps have been taken which minimize potential adverse
impacts .67
58. Id.
59. Id. at 195.
60. See infra part IV.B (discussing the permit process under H.R. 961).
61. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (1995) (containing the Clean Water Act § 404(b)(1) guidelines).
62. Id. See supra note 53 (providing the text of the water dependent definition).
63. See supra note 53 (providing the text of the water dependent definition).
64. 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.10(b)(1)-(4) (1995).
65. Id. § 230.10(c).
66. Id. §§ 230.10(c)(1)-(4).
67. Id. § 230.10(d).
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III. COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF CORPS JURISDICTION
A. UPHOLDING JURISDICTION OVER ADJACENT WETLANDS
The Corps has jurisdiction to grant a permit for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into wetland areas.68 The United States Supreme
Court upheld this interpretation of the Clean Water Act, in United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.69 In this case, Riverside Bayview
Homes placed fill materials on its property, including material in
low-lying, marshy land near the shores of Lake St. Clair in Macomb
County, Michigan. 70 The Corps, determining the wetlands to be
"adjacent wetland" under the 1975 regulation defining "waters of the
United States," filed suit to enjoin Riverside from filling the area without
the Corps' permission. 7 1 The trial court determined that the property
constitutes a covered wetland and therefore enjoined Riverside from
filling it without a permit. 72 The Sixth Circuit construed the regulation
to exclude wetlands that were not subject to flooding by adjacent
navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth of
aquatic vegetation.73
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the proper
interpretation of the Corps' regulation defining "waters of the United
States" and to determine the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction under the
Clean Water Act.74 The Court found that saturation by either surface or
ground water may bring an area within the category of wetlands,
provided that the saturation could support wetland vegetation. 75
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988). This section states that:
The Secretary [of the Army] may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites. Not later than the fifteenth day after the date an applicant
submits all the information required to complete an application for a permit under this
subsection, the Secretary shall publish the notice required by this subsection.
Id. See also A.R. Criscuolo & Assoc.'s, Inc., v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 592 A.2d 313,
318 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (providing exemption for development activities authorized by
nationwide permit issued by Army Corps of Engineers pursuant to Clean Water Act is valid exercise
of regulatory power within scope of enabling legislation).
69. 474 U.S. 121, 138 (1985).
70. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985). Riverside was
preparing for construction of a housing development. Id.
71. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 124. The Corps' jurisdiction includes wetlands adjacent to waters. 33
C.F.R. § 328.3 (1995). Regulations define "adjacent wetlands" as "bordering, contiguous, or
neighboring including wetlands separated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes
or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like." Id.
72. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 125.
73. Id. This was the second appeal of this case; the first appeal considered the effect of the
intervening amendment to the regulation. Id. The district court again held that the Corps had
jurisdiction over the property. Id.
74. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 126.
75. Id. at 129-30. The Court interpreted the definition of wetlands. See supra notes 12-16 and
NOTE
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Congress chose to define the waters covered by the Act broadly. 76
In adopting the definition of the term "navigable waters" as "the waters
of the United States," Congress sought to repudiate limits of prior
federal regulation of water pollution and to regulate at least some waters
not deemed navigable. 77  Given the congressional concern for the
protection of aquatic ecosystems, the Court required that a reasonable
interpretation of "waters" must encompass adjacent wetlands.
78
The transition between where water ends and land begins is often
not easy to define. 79 However, this transition is the determining factor
for Corps jurisdiction. 80  Faced with determining the extent of the
Corps' regulatory authority, the Court stated, that an agency may
appropriately look to the legislative history and underlying policies of its
statutory grants of authority.8 1 The Court concluded "that a definition
of 'waters of the United States' encompassing all wetlands adjacent to
other bodies of water over which the Corps has jurisdiction is a
permissible interpretation of the Act." 82 The Court discussed legislative
attempts to modify the Clean Water Act through Amendments in 1977.83
The Court determined that Congress' rejection of attempts to curb Corps
jurisdiction indicated a concern that protection of wetlands would be
hampered. 84 The Court stated:
The significance of Congress' treatment of the Corps § 404
jurisdiction in its consideration of the Clean Water Act of 1977
is twofold. First, the scope of the Corps' asserted jurisdiction
over wetlands was specifically brought to Congress' attention,
and Congress rejected measures designed to curb the Corps'
jurisdiction in large part because of its concern that protection
of wetlands would be unduly hampered by a narrowed
definition of "navigable waters." . . . Second, it is notable that
even those who would have restricted the reach of the Corps'
accompanying text (defining wetlands).
76. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132. The Court noted that section 404 originated as part of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, constituting a comprehensive legislative attempt "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Id.
(citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251). The Court found that Congress recognized that the protection of aquatic
ecosystems demanded broad federal authority to control pollution because of water's movement and
the need to control discharges at their source. Id. at 132-33.
77. Id. at 133.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 132.
80. See discussion infra part IV.B. H.R. 961 attempts to correct this jurisdictional problem by
classifying wetlands into three different categories. H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The
different categories of wetlands receive different amount of protection in the permit requirement
process. Id.
81. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132.





jurisdiction would have done so not by removing wetlands
altogether from the definition of "waters of the United
States," but only by restricting the scope of "navigable
waters" under § 404 to waters navigable in fact and their
adjacent wetlands.85
Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Corps over
the adjacent wetlands in Riverside.86 Courts have also concluded that the
Commerce Clause and the use by migratory birds of the wetland areas
requires Corps' jurisdiction over these isolated wetlands.
B. THE USE OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE TO UPHOLD AGENCY
JURISDICTION OVER WETLANDS
The federal government's powers to regulate commerce also gives
the Corps jurisdiction to regulate the dredging and filling of wetlands,
including isolated wetlands. 87 Specifically, regulation of isolated waters
and their adjacent wetlands may occur if the degradation or destruction
affects interstate or foreign commerce. 88 The Corps has determined that
certain areas are within its jurisdiction by including wetland areas as
within the "waters of the United States" when activities in those areas
effect interstate commerce.89 The wetland areas falling within this
interpretation of the Corps' jurisdiction include: (1) those which are or
could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other
purposes; (2) those from which fish or shellfish are or could be taken
and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or (3) those which are used
or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate
commerce .90
Wetland areas that may be used by migratory birds may also be
deemed to affect interstate commerce and therefore fall within the
jurisdiction of the Corps. 9 1 Jurisdiction under the migratory bird rule is
based on the assumption that birds migrating and thus crossing state
85. Id. at 137 (emphasis omitted).
86. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 139.
87. See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir.
1993) (finding agency regulation of wetlands and other bodies of water, whose use, degradation or
destruction "could affect interstate commerce," covered waters whose connection to interstate
commerce was potential rather than actual, or minimal rather than substantial).
88. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1995).
89. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1995). See generally Dennis J. Priolo, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act:
The Case for Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction Over Isolated Wetlands, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 91
(1995) (discussing Corps' jurisdiction over private landowners' isolated wetlands).
90. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(3)(i)-(iii) (1995).
91. See Lawrence R. Liebesman, Section 404 Dredging and Fill Material Discharge Permit
Program, in THE CLEAN WATER HANDBOOK 136, 143-44 (Parthenia B. Evans, ed. 1994) (discussing the
migratory bird rule).
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lines, will be the subject of bird watching, hunting and other recreational
uses.92 The effect of the destruction or degradation of their wetland
habitat will destroy or hinder these activities. 93
The Ninth Circuit in Leslie Salt Co. v. United States ,94 determined
that the commerce power and the Clean Water Act were broad enough to
extend jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to
migratory birds and endangered species. 95 The court arrived at this
conclusion after examining evidence that isolated wetlands were used by
migratory birds during flooding of the area. 96 The court arrived at this
conclusion because the Clean Water Act includes a policy of protecting
wildlife and therefore, migratory birds create the connection between a
wetland and interstate commerce.97
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in Hoffman Homes v. Administrator,
United States Environmental Protection Agency, 98 discussed the
migratory bird and isolated wetland issues.99 The Corps imposed a fine
when it determined that Hoffman had violated the Clean Water Act.100
The violation occurred when Hoffman filled and graded parts of 43
acres of wetlands in preparation for a housing development.101 The area
in question consisted of two parcels.1 0 2  Area A consisted of
approximately one acre, not connected to any body of water, but was the
source of collected rain water and snow melt and it frequently ponded or
saturated during wet weather.103 Area B consisted of approximately 13.3
acres and was a part of a 50-acre wetland adjacent to the Poplar Creek.104
Area A was an isolated wetland and thereby raised the issue of
whether the Corps had jurisdiction over isolated wetlands.105 Since the
Supreme Court had not previously ruled on whether the Corps has
jurisdiction over "isolated wetlands," the court based its decision on
interpretations of the EPA.106 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990).
95. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354,360 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126
(1991), aff'd in part, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub noa. Cargill, Inc. v. United States.
116 S. Ct 407 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 356.
97. Id. at 359-60.
98. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
99. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir.
1993).
100. Id. at 258.
101. Id. at 257-58.
102. Id. at 258.
103. Id.
104. Hoffman, 999 F.2d at 258.
105. Id. at 259-60.
106. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (referring to the United States Supreme Court's
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determined that the EPA properly interpreted 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3)
which defines the term "waters of the United States."1 07 The
interpretation was based on the inclusion in the term "waters of the
United States," wetland areas which interstate travelers could use to take
and sell fish in interstate commerce, or for industrial purposes in
interstate commerce. Use of the word "could" indicates that the
regulation covers waters whose connection to interstate commerce may
be potential, rather than actual or minimal, rather than substantial.108
The court also determined that migratory birds could serve as the
requisite connection between a wetland and interstate commerce. 109
The Seventh Circuit, in Rueth v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency,l 10 again discussed the connection between migratory
birds and the Commerce Clause."] In this case, Rueth, a real estate
developer, filled approximately three acres of wetlands without obtaining
a permit."l 2 The EPA, having concurrent jurisdiction with the Corps in
the enforcement of the Clean Water Act, ordered that Rueth cease filling
the wetlands and restore the filled areas.l13 Rueth sought after-the-fact
approval under a nationwide permit.114 The Corps denied the approval
unless ten acres or less would be affected by the development."l 5 Rueth
then sought injunctive relief against the EPA's exercise of
jurisdiction."16 The court upheld the trial court's dismissal on the
grounds that the EPA had not issued a final appealable decision.'l7
Once the EPA determines that the Clean Water Act covers a wetland and
seeks enforcement of penalties, the determination is then open to
ruling that the wetlands are within the Corps' jurisdiction). See 33 C.F.R. § 330.2 (1995) (defining
isolated waters as those non-tidal waters of the United States that are not part of a surface tributary
system to interstate or navigable of the United States and not adjacent to such tributary waterbodies).
But see United States v. Sargent County Water Resource Dist., 876 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (D.N.D. 1992)
(determining that CWA jurisdiction exists over isolated wetlands, both because of their importance to
migratory waterfowl and because of their potential use by interstate travelers for recreational
purposes). See generally Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Regulation of Non-Adjacent Wetlands Under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 23 NEw ENG. L. R EV. 615 (1987-88) (discussing jurisdiction over
isolated wetlands).
107. Hoffman, 999 F.2d at 260-61.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993).
Ill. Rueth v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 13 F.3d 227,231 (7th Cir. 1993).
112. Id. at 228.
113. Id.
114. Id. A nationwide permit is issued for activities in wetland areas that have minimal impact on
the wetland area of the discharge. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(b) (1995).
115. Rueth, 13 F.3d at 228 (noting that the Corps would reconsider its decision if the development
affected ten acres or less).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 230.
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challenge in court.118 The court also upheld its decision in Hoffman
Homes that one of the tests for whether the wetland affects interstate
commerce is whether migratory birds use the wetland. 119 Past decisions
of the court recognized Congress' intent to have the Clean Water Act
reach as far as the Commerce Clause allows.120 The Rueth decision
further illustrates courts' willingness to extend the Clean Water Act to
include wetlands not specifically mentioned in the Act.
Although not specifically defined within the Clean Water Act,
wetland protection is among the most important considerations of the
Clean Water Act if the ultimate goals of the Act are to be accomplished
and maintained. H.R. 961 imposes rigid definitions upon the wetlands of
this country and thereby reduces the protection enjoyed by wetland
areas. H.R. 961 negates over twenty years of Corps interpretation of the
Clean Water Act and the courts' recognition of their power to regulate
and protect wetland areas. For these reasons, it is imperative that H.R.
961 does not become law.
IV. COMPREHENSIVE WETLANDS CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1995
In 1995, Congress drafted and passed H.R. 961, including the
Comprehensive Wetlands Conservation and Management Act of 1995.121
rhe purpose of this legislation was to establish a new federal regulatory
program for certain wetlands and waters of the United States.122
118. Id.
119. Id. at 231.
120. Rueth, 13 F.3d at 231.
121. H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
122. Id. § 801 (b). Congress further categorized the purposes:
(1) to assert federal regulatory jurisdiction over a broad category of specifically
identified activities that result in the degradation or loss of wetlands:
(2) to provide that each federal agency, officer, and employee exercise federal
authority under section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to ensure that
agency action under such section will not limit the use of privately owned property so as
to diminish its value;
(3) to account for variations in wetlands functions in determining the character and
extent of regulation of activities occurring in wetlands areas:
(4) to provide sufficient regulatory incentives for conservation, restoration, or
enhancement activities;
(5) to encourage conservation of resources on a watershed basis to the fullest extent
practicable;
(6) to protect public safety and balance public and private interests in determining the
conditions under which activity in wetlands areas may occur: and




Although there are numerous sections to H.R. 961, this Note
focuses on the Comprehensive Wetlands Conservation and Management
Act of 1995.. This bill illustrates Congress' desire to streamline the
permit process and make it less burdensome for parties to obtain a
permit for the dredging and filling of wetlands.123
A. THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
H.R. 961 attempts to segregate wetlands into one of three categories
to differentiate between the permit process for different types of
wetlands.124 These categories are identified as Type A, Type B, and
Type C wetlands.125 Specifically, Type A wetlands are what Congress
designates as most deserving of protection.126 Type B wetlands are those
providing wildlife habitat or some significant wetland functions and
Type C wetlands are of marginal significance, but numerous or serve
123. See generally H.R. 961 § 801 (providing the text of the Comprehensive Wetlands
Conservation and Management Act of 1995).
124. Id § 803(c)(3).
125. Id. The three wetlands classifications are described as:
Type A wetlands are those wetlands that are of critical significance to the long-term
conservation or the aquatic environment of which such wetlands are a part and which
meet the following requirements:
(i) such wetlands serve critical wetlands functions, including the provision of
critical habitat for a concentration of avian, aquatic, or wetland dependent
wildlife;
(ii) such wetlands consist of or may be a portion of ten or more contiguous
acres and have an inlet or outlet for relief of water flow; except that this
requirement shall not operate to preclude the classification as Type A
wetlands lands containing prairie pothole features, playa lakes, or vernal
pools if such lands otherwise meet the requirements for Type A
classification under this paragraph;
(iii) there exists a scarcity within the watershed or aquatic environment of
identified functions served by such wetlands such that the use of such wetlands
for an activity in wetlands or waters of the United States would seriously
jeopardize the availability or these identified wetlands functions; and
(iv) there is unlikely to be an overriding public interest in the use of such wetlands for
purposes other than conservation;
Type B wetlands are those wetlands that provide habitat for a significant population of
wetland dependent wildlife or provide other significant wetlands functions, including
significant enhancement or protection of water quality or significant natural flood
control, and
Type C wetlands are all wetlands that:
(i) serve limited wetlands functions;
(ii) serve marginal wetlands functions but which exist in such abundance that
regulation of activities in such wetlands is not necessary for conserving important
wetlands functions;
(iii) are prior converted cropland;
(iv) are fastlands; or
(v) are wetlands within industrial, commercial, or residential complexes or other
intensely developed areas that do not serve significant wetlands functions as a
result of such location.
Id.
126. Id. § 803(e).
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limited wetland functions.127 The amount of wetlands in each of these
categories is subject to certain restraints. 128 For example, H.R. 961 limits
the amount of Type A wetlands designated for protection in any given
county.129 By classifying wetlands, Congress sought to assign a value to
wetland areas without the benefit of expert opinion.130 To assign value
to an area, Congress considered the importance of the wetland area to
habitat and the aquatic environment. 131 This relationship is balanced
with the public interest in the use of the wetland area. 132 The
classification of the wetland area is important because of the different
permit processes for each classification.
B. THE PERMIT PROCESS UNDER H.R. 961
1. Type A Wetlands
Type A wetlands receive the greatest amount of protection. 133 The
agency uses "sequential analysis" to avoid adverse impacts on the
wetland, minimize the adverse impacts that cannot be avoided, and
compensate for wetland functions that cannot be avoided or
minimized.134 The Secretary mandates mitigation if he or she finds it
necessary to prevent the unacceptable loss or degradation of Type A
wetlands.135
H.R. 961 sets out mitigation measures in the permit process for
Type A and Type B wetlands.1 36 Mitigation required under H.R. 961
for activities in Type A and B wetlands includes:
minimization-of-impacts considerations in the project design; donation
of Type A or B wetlands as mitigation for alteration or degradation of
127. Id.
128. H.R. 961 § 803(g).
129. Id. § 803(g)(2). This section provides:
No more than 20 percent of any county, parish, or borough shall be classified as Type A
wetlands. Type A wetlands in federal or state ownership (including Type A wetlands in
units of the National Wildlife Refuge System, The National Park System, and lands held
in conservation easements) shall be included in calculating the percent of Type A
wetlands in a county, parish, or borough.
Id.
130. See generally Emily Goodman, Defining Wetlands for Regulatory Purposes: A Case Study
in the Role of Science in Policymaking, 2 BuFF. ENVTL. LJ. 135 (1994) (discussing attempts to define
wetlands).
131. H.R. 961 § 803(c)(3)(A)(iii)-(B).
132. Id. § 803(c)(3)(iv)..
133. Id. § 803(e)(2)(A). This section provides that "[tihe Secretary shall determine whether to
issue a permit for an activity in waters of the United States Classified under subsection (c) as Type A
wetlands based on a sequential analysis." Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 803(e)(2) (B).
136. HR. 961 § 803(e)(3)(D).
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wetlands; and creation of wetlands to compensate for wetland
degradation. 137 These mitigation measures are similar to those specified
in the Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Department of the Army Concerning the
Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section
404(b)(1) Guidelines [hereinafter MOA].138 However, H.R. 961 also
defines instances when there is no requirement for mitigation.1 39
Mitigation is not required when the Secretary finds that the adverse
impact of an activity is limited, the failure to impose mitigation is
compatible with maintaining wetland functions, no practical means of
mitigation are available, there is an abundance of similar wetlands'
functions in the area continuing to serve the functions the activity will
destroy, the nature of the impact is temporary, or a waiver is necessary to
prevent special hardship.140
In the past, mitigation and compensatory mitigation protected
valued wetland areas by minimizing the adverse effects caused by
widespread permit activities. However, there are no mitigation
requirements of mitigation measures when a significant amount of
wetlands exist in the area. 14 1 Congress did not specify the amount of
wetlands that equaled "a significant amount of wetlands."142 This
policy can be likened to the cap placed on the amount of Type A
wetlands available in a given area because Congress has again
137. Id. § 803(e)(3)(D)(i), (ii), (iv). Also considered to be mitigation measures:
(v) compensation through contribution to a mitigation bank program established pursuant
to paragraph (4);
(vi) offsite compensatory mitigation if such mitigation contributes to the restoration,
enhancement or creation of significant wetlands functions on a watershed basis and is
balanced with the effects that the proposed activity will have on the specific site: except
that offsite compensatory mitigation, if any, shall be required only within the State within
which the proposed activity is to occur, and shall, to the extent practicable, be within the
watershed within which the proposed activity is to occur, unless otherwise consistent with
a State wetlands management plan;
(vii) contribution of in-kind value acceptable to the Secretary and otherwise authorized
by law:
(viii) in areas subject to wetlands loss, the construction of coastal protection and
enhancement projects:
(ix) contribution of resources of more than one permittee toward a single mitigation
project; and
(x) other mitigation measures, including contributions of other than in-kind value
referred to in clause (vii), determined by the Secretary to be appropriate in the public
interest and consistent with the requirements and purposes of this Act.
Id. § 803(e)(3)(D)(v)-(x).
138. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act
Section 404(b)(1), 20 ENVTL. L. REP. (EPA) 35,223 (February 6, 1990) [hereinafter MOA].
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determined that only a limited amount of wetland areas are worthy of
protection.143 Even though Congress has determined that Type A and
certain Type B wetlands are significant, the value of these wetlands
diminish when a determination is made that there are other similar
wetlands in the area. 144 It appears inconsistent with the protection of
significant wetland areas to limit the amount of wetland areas that fall
within the extended protection as set out by H.R. 961.145
Mitigation measures are also satisfied when the secretary finds the
activities in Type A wetlands are carried out in accordance with state
approved reclamation plans or revegetation plans following mining and
when the activity achieves overall environmental benefits.1 4 6
Additionally, mitigation required by the secretary is carried out in
accordance with that required for Type B wetlands.147
2. Type B Wetlands
Activities undertaken in Type B wetlands also require a permit for
the dredging and filling of areas under H.R. 961.148 Although a permit
is required in Type B wetlands, the requirements for permitting an
activity in Type B wetlands are less stringent.149 The issuing authority is
bound by the purpose stated on the application, whether the specified
project purpose is the actual project purpose is irrelevant in the
application process.150 The issuing authority, in determining whether to
issue a permit, considers the following: a) the quality and quantity of the
wetland area affected by the activity;151 b) the opportunities to reduce
impacts through the minimization of the area affected;1 52 c) the costs of
mitigation in light of the economic and social benefits of the proposed
activity;153 d) the ability to re-create the wetland functions and the
impact on the surrounding watershed 54 and; e) whether the impact on
143. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing the cap put on Type A wetlands).
144. H.R. 961 § 803(e)(3)(E).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See infra notes 157-162 and accompanying text (discussing mitigation measures for Type B
wetlands).
148. H.R. 961 § 803(e)(3).
149. Id. § 803(e)(3)(A). This section states that "the Secretary may issue a permit authorizing
activities in Type B wetlands if the Secretary finds that issuance of the permit is in the public interest,
balancing the reasonably foreseeable benefits and detriments resulting from the issuance of the
permit." Id.
150. Id. § 803(e)(3)(B). This section provides that "in considering an application for activities on
Type B wetlands, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the project purpose as defined by the
applicant shall be binding upon the Secretary." Id.
151. Id. § 803(e)(3)(A)(i).
152. Id. § 803(e)(3)(A)(ii).
153. H.R. 961 § 803(e)(3)(A)(iii).
154. Id. § 803(e)(3)(A)(v), (vi).
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the wetland is temporary or permanent.155 These factors convey that the
wetlands in question are replaceable, or are at least less significant than
the public's interest in the undertaking of the activity being promoted.
By applying the list set out in H.R. 961, the issuing authority will be
influenced to permit the activity in the promotion of the public's best
interest because of the overwhelming weight of factors that favor
permitting the activity. The ability to mitigate the damage or measure
the value of the wetland by the use of certain migratory birds or wildlife
may be immaterial when measured against a rich mineral or oil deposit,
or other factors that in the short term may be deemed as in the public's
best interest. 156
Mitigation is an important aspect in the analysis of permitting under
H.R. 961.157 Congress determined that when an impact upon wetlands is
unavoidable, the person requesting the permit should mitigate the loss of
wetlands.158 As with many other aspects of wetland issues, the courts and
others have dealt with and discussed the issue of mitigation. 159 In 1990,
the Corps and the EPA introduced the MOA. 160 One of the goals of the
MOA was to maintain no overall net loss of this country's remaining
wetlands as set out in the 404(b)(1) guidelines.'61 The no overall net
loss of the remaining wetlands refers to a goal of one for one functional
replacement of lost wetlands.1 62 The factors that the MOA attempts to
use to accomplish the goal of no overall net loss include an evaluation of
mitigation to avoid, to the maximum extent possible, wetland losses,
minimize impacts, and compensate through mitigation unavoidable
wetland losses.163 The goal of "no net loss" of the remaining wetlands,
in the MOA, assured that protection of wetlands would continue by
ensuring that permits would not be granted for the dredging or filling of
wetlands without a determination that impacts are minimized, avoided, or
155. Id. § 803(e)(3)(A)(vii).
156. See Id. § 803(e)(3)(A)(i)-(iv).
157. id. § 803(C).
158. HR. 961 § 803 ©.
159. See Plantation Landing Resort, Inc. v. United States, 30 Ci. Ct. 63, 69 (Cl. Ct. 1993) (finding
denial of permit was premised on failure to reach agreement on mitigation requirements to offset
wetland losses); See generally Debra L. Donahue, Taking a Hard Look at Mitigation: The Case for the
Northwest Indian Rule, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 687 (1988) (discussing the effects of cases in the
development of mitigation policies); Carol E. Dinkins, Regulatory Obstacles To Development and
Redevelopment in the US.: Wetlands and Other Essential Issues, C945 A.L.I. A.B.A. 491,508 (1994)
(discussing mitigation policies); Liebesman. supra note 91, at 143-44 (discussing mitigation policy and
banking).
160. See MOA, supra note 138, at 35,223.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. See also Mark A. Chertok, Federal Regulation of Wetlands, C921 A.L.I. A.B.A. 1311,
1138 (1994) (discussing the factors used in the MOA to accomplish the goal of no overall net loss).
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the wetland area is replaced.164 Clearly, the protection afforded wetland
areas in the past is reduced by H.R. 961 for Type A and Type B
wetlands.165
3. Type C Wetlands
Activities in wetlands which the secretary classifies as Type C
wetlands can be undertaken without any required authorization. 166
Congress defined Type C wetlands as those that serve limited wetlands'
functions, serve marginal functions but are in such abundance that
regulation is unnecessary, are prior converted cropland,1 67 are
fastlands,168 or exist in industrial, commercial, or residential complexes
or other developed areas. 169 It appears from H.R. 961 that Congress has
determined that Type C wetlands are relatively insignificant and that
filling or other activities in these areas are without consequence.1 70 In
the past, the Corps has determined that certain wetlands, classified as
Type C wetlands under H.R. 961, were subject to protection even when
the wetland would appear to serve limited wetland functions.
The Ninth Circuit in Leslie Salt Co. v. United States,171 dealt with
the issue of a government created wetland area in old calcium chloride
pits.172 The prior owners of the land were salt manufacturers and turned
pasture land into pits for the depositing of calcium chloride. 173 The
calcium chloride created large, shallow, water tight basins. 174 In 1959,
164. MOA, supra note 138, at 35,223.
165. See HR. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 803(e)(2), (3) (1995).
166. Id.
167. 136 CONG. REc. H10616-02, H10622 (Oct. 19, 1990).
Prior converted cropland' is defined . . . as wetlands which were both manipulated
(drained or otherwise physically altered to remove excess water from the land) and
cropped before 23 December 1985, to the extent that they no longer exhibit important
wetland values. Specifically, prior converted cropland is inundated with water for no
more than 14 consecutive days during the growing season. Prior converted cropland
generally does not include pothole or playa wetlands. In addition, wetlands that are
seasonally flooded or ponded for 15 or more consecutive days during the growing season
are not considered prior converted cropland.
Id.
168. 140 CoN.REc. S13853-01, S13871 (Sept. 30, 1994). "The term 'fastlands' means lands
located behind permitted manmade structures, such as lands located behind a levee to permit
utilization of the lands for commercial, industrial, or residential purposes consistent with each local
land use planning requirement." Id.
169. HR. 961 § 803(c)(3)(C).
170. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (determining that activities in Type C wetland
areas can be undertaken without a permit).
171. 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990).
172. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126
(1991), aff'd in part, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom., Cargill, Inc. v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).




salt production ceased but the pits remained. 175 Due to rainfall and
development around the area, including plowing of the property by
Leslie to curb dust problems, natural ecological developments resulted in
the creation of wetland features near the edge of the Leslie property.1 76
Migratory birds used the pits during the winter and spring flooding of
the property.177 In order to drain the property, Leslie dug drainage
ditches. 178 The Corps responded by issuing a cease and desist order
which claimed that Leslie was violating the Clean Water Act by
discharging fill into the waters of the United States without a permit.179
The court identified the two issues in this case as: (1) whether Congress
intended for the Clean Water Act to extend to property made aquatic in
part through actions of the government;1 80 and (2) whether the Corps'
regulations interpreting the Act provided for the Corps' jurisdiction over
the area. 18 1
The court further determined that the identity of the party
responsible for flooding the land was irrelevant. 182 Additionally, the
method in which the lands became wetlands was not the determining
factor of the Corps' jurisdiction.' 8 3 Jurisdiction was determined by
whether the site was presently considered a wetland area and not how it
came to be a wetland site. 184 The court stated that the proper response to
the Corps' actions was to seek damages through inverse condemnation
proceedings and not to restrict the jurisdiction of the Corps.185
The wetland area at issue in Leslie Salt is similar to what Congress
has classified as Type C wetlands. The court determined that migratory
birds and endangered species may use the property as habitat. 186 The
Commerce Clause and the Clean Water Act are therefore broad enough
that the Corps' jurisdiction may be extended to these waters.187 It is
reasonable to conclude that these species may also use wetland areas
175. Id.
176. Id. at 356.
177. Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 356.
178. Id. at 355-56.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 356-57. The state highway authority breached a levy on the wildlife refuge adjacent
to the property and destroyed a tidegate which had prevented the tidal backflow from reaching
Leslie's property. Id. at 356.
181. Id. at 357.
182. Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 358.
183. Id. See also Bailey v. United States, 647 F. Supp. 44, 48 (D. Idaho 1986) (citing United
States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.NJ. 1984) as authority for finding Army Corps of Engineers
has jurisdiction over wetlands even though wetlands may have been artificially created through
construction of a dam).
184. Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 358.
185. Id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 (1985)).
186. Id. at 360.
187. Id.
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classified as Type C wetlands as habitat and, as in the past, raise
Commerce Clause considerations. The case was remanded to the District
Court, which entered judgment against the property owner who then
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 188 Upholding the District Court's findings
that the jurisdiction of the Corps reached the waters in question, the court
stated the Clean Water Act's policy of protecting wildlife could plausibly
extend jurisdiction to isolated waters used only by migratory birds, even
though, there is no suggestion of this conclusion within the Act.189 The
court found that it is reasonable to conclude that migratory birds can act
as the connection between a wetland and interstate commerce. 190
In Leslie Salt, the wetlands in question were waters created by a third
party which migratory birds and endangered species used as habitat.191
This type of wetland could easily be defined as Type C wetlands under
H.R. 961. Unfortunately, by creating H.R. 961, Congress has
determined that Type C wetland areas are unworthy of protection. In
Leslie Salt, the Ninth Circuit determined that this type of wetland was
subject to the jurisdiction of the Corps. 192 These and other similar
wetland areas under H.R. 961 will no longer be protected to the same
degree as they have been in the past.
C. OTHER WETLAND AREAS THAT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE PERMIT
PROCESS UNDER H.R. 961
Other wetlands areas are not subject to the permit process under
H.R. 961.193 For example, an activity in wetlands or waters of the United
States may be undertaken without a permit from the Secretary if that
activity is authorized under a general permit for activities determined to
not result in a significant loss of wetland functions or values.194 General
permits apply to activities similar in nature, and those activities, when
performed separately and cumulatively, will not result in the significant
loss of ecologically significant wetlands' values and functions. 195 These
general permits may be issued on a state, regional, or nationwide basis
188. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Leslie Salt II].
189. Id. at 1394-95. See also supra note 91-92 (discussing the link between migratory birds and
interstate commerce).
190. Leslie Salt 11, 55 F.3d 1395-96. See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979)
(finding that a prohibition against the transportation of minnows out of the state is a violation of the
Commerce Clause). A significant effect on the activities of wildlife can be linked to the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 336-37.
191. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1126 (1991), aff'd in part, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nor., Cargill, Inc. v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
192. Id.
193. H.R. 961. 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 803(b)(2) (1995).
194. Id.
195. Id. § 803(e)(8).
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for a number of activities. 196 The important aspect of this provision is
the determination by the Secretary of when an activity will not result in
"significant loss of ecologically significant wetlands' values and
functions."197 The Secretary makes the determination after considering
the amount of conserved wetlands already within a state. 198 As in other
areas of H.R. 961, Congress may make a determination to issue permits
without considering the effects on a particular wetland area. Each
wetland area has its own characteristics and performs its own functions.
Determinations made generally regarding activities under this general
permit system may cause different amounts of damage to different
wetland areas.
H.R. 961 also sets out activities in wetlands or waters of the United
States which are exempt from the permit requirements altogether. 199
This list includes eighteen categories of exempt activities.200 The list of
exempt activities exists because Congress determined that these activities
are more important than the protection of wetlands. 20 1 These
exemptions endanger the continued existence of wetlands in these areas.
H.R. 961 also allows for wetlands located on agricultural lands and
associated nonagricultural lands to be delineated by the Secretary of
Agriculture 202 under the Food Security Act of 1985.203 Lands exempt
from requirements of subtitle C of Title XII of the Food Security Act are
also exempt from permitting requirements in H.R. 961.204 Therefore, by
finding ways to conduct farming activities in wetland areas, individuals in
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. H.R. 961 § 803(e)(8)(E).
199. Id. § 803(f).
200. Id. The following is a list of the permit-exempt activities: § 803(f)(1)(A) (farming and
other agricultural activities); § 803(11(1)(B) (maintenance of dams and other water control devises); §
803(f)(1)(C) (ranching); § 803(f)(l)(D) (construction of sedimentary basins); § 803(f)(l)(E)
(maintenance of farm, forest roads and utility roads); § 803(f)(1)(F) (activities undertaken on farmed
wetlands); § 803(f)(l)(G) (activities for which a state has an approved plan); § 803(f)(1)(H)
(activities consistent with a land management plan approved by the secretary); § 803(f)(1)(I) (marsh
management); § 803(f)(1)(J) (activities within a coastal zone); § 803(11(1)(K) (activities undertaken
in incidentally created wetlands); § 803(f)(l)(L) (activities for preserving and enhancing aviation
safety): § 803(f)(l)(M) (activities as a result of aggregate or clay mining); § 803(f)(l)(N),(O)
(placement of a structural member for a pile-supported structure including pilings for a linear project
or a pier boathouse); § 803(f)(1)(P) (clearing of vegetation in a right of way of a power line
structure); § 803(11(1)(Q) (activities in water filled depressions incidental to construction activities); §
803(f)1)(R) (activities undertaken by a State with substantially conserved wetlands for activities such
as providing for the infrastructure, log transfer facilities and ice roads and snow disposal). See also
Joseph G. Theis, Wetlands Loss and Agriculture: The Failed Federal Regulation of Farming Activities
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing agricultural
effects on wetland issues).
201. H.R. 961 § 803(f).
202. Id. § 803(F)(3)(A).
203. 16 U.S.C. § 3822 (Supp. 1995).
204. H.R. 961 § 803(11(3)(B).
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the agricultural field can exempt their activity from the permit
regulation.
D. COMPENSATION PAID TO LANDOWNERS WHEN AGENCY ACTION
DIMINISHES THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
Upon the denial of a permit for activities in wetland areas, agencies
such as the Corps can anticipate when the agency's actions. constitute a
taking. One author has concluded that "[b]ecause natural resources
regulation is an accepted and firmly entrenched aspect of state and
federal regulatory systems, most permit denials are unlikely to constitute
takings." 205  Clearly, if signed by the President, the present
Congressional effort invalidates this statement because H.R. 961
statutorily seeks to set compensation lines for denied permits. 206 H.R.
961 defines when a landowner will be compensated for the loss of use
due to the actions of the government. 2 0 7 H.R. 961 compensates a
landowner for the diminution in value if the loss is greater than twenty
percent where the compensation amount equals the diminution in value
as a result of the agency action. 208 If the diminution in value is more
than fifty percent, at the owner's option, the federal government shall
buy the property at its fair market value. 209 Previously, courts have
allowed for compensation to be paid to the land owner only when a
denial of all viable use of the property occurs.210
The regulatory taking threat has a direct effect on the actions of
decision makers, such as the Corps, in the granting or denial of permits.
Prior to H.R. 961, the determination of when compensation would be
forthcoming from the government due to governmental action was based
on judicially developed guidelines. 2 11 These judicially developed
guidelines considered whether a reasonable expectation of a property
right exists and whether the government action deprives the claimant of
205. Danielson & Nordell, supra note 46, at 357.




210. See Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir 1994 ) (finding removal of all use
of property indicates a fully compensable "categorical taking" of the property.); Dufau v. United
States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156. 162 (Cl. Ct. 1990), affid, 940 F.2d 677 (Fed.Cir. 1991) (finding that landowners
claiming a temporary taking of their land had to prove that substantially all economically viable use of
their property was lost by denying their permit to fill wetlands); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 159-61 (Cl. Ct. 1990), aff'd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed.Cir. 1994) (finding that a
regulatory taking occurred when the value of a landowners' property decreased by over 99% after
the Army Corps of Engineers denied a permit to fill 11.5 acres of wetlands).
211. See generally Stephen R. Kelly, Note, The Erosion of the Clean Water Act Through Inverse
Condemnation: Can Wetlands Withstand the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?, 5 B.Y.U. J. PuB.
L. 235 (1991) (discussing regulatory takings in wetland cases).
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virtually all economically viable use of the property. 2 12 In Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,213 the United States Supreme Court
determined that when the government deprives a landowner of all
economically viable use of his or her property, a taking has occurred,
even when the state acts to protect the health and safety of residents.214
The Court described two categories of regulatory action requiring
compensation without inquiry into the public interest advanced by the
government action.215 First, when the regulations compel the property
owner to suffer a physical invasion of his property. 216 Second, as
discussed above, where the regulation denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of the property.217 The Court determined that the state
supreme court's denial of compensation was invalid. 218 The holding in
Lucas and other court decisions indicate a judicially developed
determination of when the Constitution requires compensation to be paid
due to governmental actions affecting private property.
The United States Claims Court articulated the two inquiries
necessary to make the determination of whether there has been a
regulatory taking as a result of government action. 219 The first inquiry
considers whether the Agency actions cause a denial of all economically
viable use of the property. 220 The second inquiry centers on the extent
to which the permit denial interferes with distinct, reasonable,
investment-backed expectations.221
Congress should leave the determination to compensate landowners
to the judiciary. Due to this country's $4 trillion national deficit, 222 the
government will likely base its decisions on the lack of funds available
and therefore, an inability to purchase the property in question or pay
212. See generally Bhavani Prasad V. Nerikar, Comment, This Wetland is Your Land, This
Wetland is My Land: Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Its Impact on the Private Development
of Wetlands, 4 ADmIN. LJ. 197 (1990) (discussing the requirements in order to find that a compensable
taking has occurred).
213. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
214. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992). With the intent of
building single family homes, Lucas purchased two residential lots on a South Carolina barrier island.
Id. at 2889. In 1988, the state legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act, barring Lucas
from developing any permanent residence on the property. Id. Lucas filed suit claiming that the Act
deprived him of all economic viable use of his property, constituting a taking under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments requiring compensation. Id. at 2889-90.
215. Id. at 2893.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2901-02. Compensation was not required in Lucas because the Act furthered the
public interest of preserving the beachfront. Id.
219. Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310,318 (Cl. Ct. 1991).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Nancy Mathis, House Does Its Balancing Act, Plan Trims Health Programs, 3 Cabinet-Level
Departments, HousTON CHRONICLE, May 19, 1995, at 1.
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the compensation arising because of the agency action. The threat of
paying compensation may very well work to the detriment of wetland
protection and the arbitrary granting of permits. for activities in wetland
areas.
H.R. 961 includes exceptions to the payment of compensation. 223
The bill states that compensation will not be paid upon the denial of a
permit if the agency action is to prevent an identifiable hazard to public
health or safety or to prevent damage to specific property other than the
property in question. 224  These exceptions are similar to those
recognized by the Supreme Court.225 The Supreme Court has stated that
a public purpose is not enough in itself to relieve the government of
paying compensation. 226 Additionally, H.R. 961 finds that if the use of
the property is a nuisance, as defined by the law of a state, or already
prohibited under a local zoning ordinance, then compensation is not
required if the Corps denies a permit.227
Congress is attempting to compensate landowners based upon a set
percentage of loss of viable use.228 Under H.R. 961, the denial of a
permit may constitute a compensable taking. However, due to the
extreme differences in the wetland areas that come under the jurisdiction
of this bill and the wide range of justifications for the denial of a permit,
compensation lines drafted from the chambers of Congress appear
arbitrary.
V. ATTEMPTS TO MODIFY H.R. 961
Republican Congressman Sherwood L. Boehlert from New York
offered an amendment to H.R. 961 on May 15, 1995, which the National
Governors' Association approved. 229 This amendment would give to
states the ability to implement a wetland conservation and permitting
223. H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 803(d)(4) (1995).
224. Id. § 803(d)(4)(A).
225. See, eg., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (finding that
in instances such as zoning laws where a state tribunal has reasonably concluded that "the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare" would be promoted by prohibiting certain land uses the Court has
upheld regulations that destroyed or adversely affected interests in real property).
226. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The Court found that the mere
existence of a public purpose was insufficient to release the government from the compensation
requirement. Id. "The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is
wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation." Id.
227. HR. 961 § 803(d)(3). See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897
(1992) (determining compensation is not required if the use is a nuisance under state law, and the state
must identify background principles of nuisance law prohibiting the landowners' intended use to avoid
compensation).
228. HR. 961 § 803(d).
229. 141 CONG. REC. H4934-09, H4939 (daily ed. May 15, 1995).
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plan. 230 According to Congressman Boehlert, the amendment has five
main advantages which include: (1) recognizing the needs of farmers;
(2) increasing local control; (3) not creating any new regulating entity;
(4) speeding the regulatory process; and (5) providing a reasonable
appeals process.231 This amendment would strike Title VIII of H.R. 961
and substitute Title VIII Wetlands Conservation and Management. 232
The amendment would allow for renewed protection of wetland
areas by giving state or local governments the ability to regulate the
permit process. 233  The Boehlert amendment received some support;
however, the House defeated the amendment by a vote of 185-242.234
One of the main concerns with the amendment was that it altered the
proposed compensation provision of H.R. 961.235 Some members of
Congress understood the need for the protection of wetlands and
rigorously supported the amendment. 236 However, the individuals
believing that a rigid definition was needed in order to curve the Corps
and the EPA from abusing their jurisdictional powers prevailed. 237
230. Id. at H4935.
231. Id. at H4940 (statement of Rep. Boehlert).
232. Id. at H4934.
233. Id. at H4935.
234. 141 CONG. Rc. H4978-01, H4986 (daily ed. May 16,1995).
235. Id. at 4978.
236. Id. at 4979. Democratic Congressman Jim Oberstar from Minnesota stated:
Mr. Chairman, our Nation was rich in wetlands when the settlement of America
began. But civilization took its harsh toll: agriculture, highways, railroads, cities, suburbs,
exurbs, flood control, destroying the wetlands along our Nation's major riverways and
our coastal waterways. All in the interest of progress and without concern for an
understanding of the enormous power and strength of the wetlands as a filtering device,
preventing sediment from getting into the streams, preventing pollution from getting into
our major waterways, estuaries, and lakes.
By the time I was elected to Congress in the mid-1970s, the lower 48 States had
been diminished in wetlands by half. Our migratory waterfowl have declined in numbers
over the years, and few are here in the Chamber today who can remember, but all of us
surely should have studied the dust bowl days of the 1930s caused, not by drying up of
the rains, but by man's thoughtless and senseless use and overuse of the land, draining
the wetland-rich prairie pothole region of America's midsection.
One-third of our endangered and threatened species are sheltered by wetlands.
Id.
237. Id. at H4980. Republican Congressman Tom Latham from Iowa stated:
First of all, let me say that everyone who will speak against this amendment today
shares a commitment to protecting genuine wetlands. The key issue, as I hope to
demonstrate in a moment, is how broadly a wetland is defined. Because if you are a
bureaucrat with the EPA or other Federal agency, wetland does not mean something is a
pond or a bog or a swamp or a marsh. In fact, over the last eight years, we have seen
areas defined as wetlands where water never actually stands or where there is a low
spot in a cornfield, and regulators, in their never ending search for more control, have
stretched laws designed to affect navigable waters so that they can regulate farmland in
north central Iowa that is at least 100 miles from any navigable water. That is how the
environmental extremists come up with their astonishing claims about wetlands being left
unprotected by this bill.
In the ideal world the overwhelming majority of Americans currently live in areas
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VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly, from the actions of Congress in the last legislative session,
there is a desire and urgency on the part of its members to modify and
amend the Clean Water Act. H.R. 961, Title VIII will have a devastating
effect on existing wetland areas. The rigid classification system will
allow for the filling of numerous wetland areas. Although Congress has
recognized the importance of Type A wetlands, by subjecting Type A
wetlands to a cap, Congress still only recognizes a certain percentage of
Type A wetlands as worthy of extended protection. The wetlands above
this cap presumably have the same characteristics as others in the area,
yet because of the cap, those areas will be subject to a less stringent
permit process.
The compensation system of H.R. 961 will cost this country and will
influence decision makers in the permit process. The pressure of
monetary payments in a time of cutting expenses will influence decision
makers when faced with a permit for the filling of a wetland area. The
wetland protection that this country recently witnessed under the Clean
Water Act may take a step backward because of the threat of
compensation for each permit denial.
After analyzing H.R. 961 and the attempts to modify its broad
sweeping regulations, as in the Boehlert amendment, 38 what Congress
sought to pass and passed was a bill that will have devastating effects on
the wetlands of this country. Wetlands are valuable to the environment
and to the existence of a diverse ecosystem. However, according to some
estimates, a large percentage of this country's wetlands will be subject to
destruction as a result of H.R. 961.239 As previously stated, the mission
of the Clean Water Act is "to maintain the chemical, physical, and
that could be defined as wetlands. If you define everything as a wetland, no matter how
against common sense that definition may be, you can pretty much give yourself the right
to regulate what every American does with his or her property.
Id.
238. See supra notes 229-233 and accompanying text (containing Boehlert's recommendations
and proposed amendment).
239. 141 CONG. REC. H4978-01, H4978 (daily ed. May 16, 1995) (statement of Rep. Borski).
Democratic Congressman Borski from Pennsylvania stated:
The bill will eliminate protection for 60 to 80% of the existing wetlands. In my State of
Pennsylvania, 40% of all wetlands will be removed from protection, including more than
150,000 acres of floodplain wetlands that protect Chesapeake Bay from polluted runoff.
In New Jersey, 35 to 50% of all wetlands would lose protection. In Delaware, more than
50% of the wetlands would lose protection. H.R. 961 decides, without regard to science,
what wetlands will be protected and which will not.
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biological integrity of the Nations waters." 240 Since wetlands constitute
our "Nations waters," H.R. 961 clearly contradicts the essence of the
Clean Water Act by sacrificing an invaluable and irreplaceable national
resource.
Consequently, some have coined this act as the "Dirty Water
Act." 241 Whether H.R. 961 will live up to what its critics have called it
remain to be seen, but by allowing for the destruction of wetlands, the
Act is well on its way. Therefore, this author urges President Clinton to
veto H.R. 961 or, alternatively, encourages the Senate to rewrite its
provisions.
Steven W. Watkins242
240. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988) (discussing the purpose of the Clean Water Act).
241. Scott Collins, Environmentalists Say Clean Water Act Revisions Threaten Bay, Wetlands, Los
ANGELES TME, May 21,1995, at J3.
242. The author would like to thank his wife, Allison, for her support and encouragement over
the last three years.
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